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IMPLAUSIBLE INJURIES: WAL-MART V. DUKES AND
THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Marcia L. McCormick*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1
has broad implications for the future of class actions, particularly
when the defendant's state of mind matters to the claim or when the
case involves potentially complicated questions of causation. Moreo-
ver, when the decision is combined with the Court's recent decisions
regarding pleading requirements, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 and judges' views on how people behave, the future
of class actions seems very uncertain. The Court has invited lower
court judges to consider what kinds of legal wrongs they think people
are likely to engage in and to focus on what makes members of a
putative class different rather than what makes them alike. That invi-
tation will inevitably result in fewer class actions and may make it
impossible to bring class actions for some types of claims.
II. RULE 23 AND WAL-MART V. DUKES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. It pro-
vides that a class action can be maintained if a party, or more than
one, meets certain prerequisites and if the claims raised fit one of
three prescribed models. 4 If the parties seeking class certification fail
at either step, that class cannot be certified.5
The prerequisites are laid out in rule 23(a), and require that
(1) the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
* Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In Twombly, the Court heightened the
pleading standard laid out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 by requiring that a complaint set
forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," but denied that this
required "heightened fact pleading of specifics." Id. at 570.
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
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(2) there [be] questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties [be able to] fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. 6
These requirements have been given the shorthand of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 7
Once the parties meet the prerequisites, they must show that one of
the conditions set out in 23(b) is satisfied-essentially that the claim
fits into one of the listed models. The class may proceed if pursuing
the actions separately would result in varied judgments that could es-
tablish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would
affect the interests of parties that are not part of the action.8 Alterna-
tively, if the defendant acted in a way that applies generally to the
class so that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, the parties
can proceed as a class.9 Finally, the class can be certified if the ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.10
A. Background
The Dukes litigation was initiated by the Impact Fund, a nonprofit
legal organization that provides support for litigation that is brought
to advance economic and social justice.11 It sought to change the
working culture at Wal-Mart, 12 the country's largest private em-
ployer.13 A class claim was the only way to do so. The case began in
2001 when Betty Dukes and five other women sued Wal-Mart for sex
discrimination in pay, promotions to salaried management positions,
and job assignments. 14 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all
women employed by Wal-Mart or who had worked for the company
since 1998 and been subjected to Wal-Mart's policies.' 5 The plaintiffs
presented evidence that Wal-Mart had no formal policies on promo-
tion beyond the hourly-paid department manager positions, rates of
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
7. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
11. About Us, IMPACr FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.phpcat-id=4 (last visited Mar.
4, 2013).
12. See Impact Fund Cases, IMPACt FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.phpcat-id=95
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
14. See id. at 2547-48.
15. Id. at 2548-49.
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pay within a range, or job assignments; rather, Wal-Mart left decisions
to the discretion of individual managers and provided no information
to the employees on how pay, promotion, or job assignments would be
determined.16 At the same time, the company maintained a very
strong corporate culture that promoted many traditional social values,
including values about gender roles, and there was evidence that gen-
der stereotypes permeated the company at all levels. 17 The plaintiffs
alleged that this combination allowed gender stereotypes to operate
and influence employment decisions, resulting in a gender pay gap
across all regions in the company's stores and at every pay level, as
well as a gender gap in promotions-well over two-thirds of employ-
ees eligible for promotion were women, but only about one-third were
in management.18 The plaintiff class sought injunctive relief related to
Wal-Mart's promotion and pay policies and also sought backpay for
the class.
The district court certified the class for the pay and promotion
claims, 19 and the Ninth Circuit, with some small variations on the defi-
nition of the class, affirmed. 20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed again sitting
en banc,21 with five judges dissenting on the ground that, essentially,
such a large putative class made the case too complex to certify. 22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether
the putative class satisfied the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a)(2) and (2) whether the relief sought and the theory of the case
brought the class within the limits of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2)
requires that "the party opposing the class ha[ve] acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole."
16. See id. at 2553-56; see also id. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145-66 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (recounting
and analyzing the "extensive" evidence of commonality).
17. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 152-53. But see Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548, 2553-56 (characterizing the
claim about a strong corporate culture as a theory rather than as fact, and rejecting the other
evidence as insufficient to prove that the strong culture combined with delegated, unguided dis-
cretion could lead to widespread discrimination).
18. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146, 155.
19. Id. at 173.
20. A three-judge panel issued one opinion, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.
2007), then withdrew it and issued another opinion, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2007).
21. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 620-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting
class certification on plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages and removing from the class women
who did not work for Wal-Mart at the time the complaint was filed).
22. See id. at 628 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); id. at 652 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that they had shown
that the class met Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement by show-
ing that members of the class were all injured by discrimination
against women caused by Wal-Mart's policies and culture.23 To sup-
port their arguments, the plaintiffs provided evidence from three ex-
perts. First, a statistician analyzed pay and personnel data;
documented the gender gap within stores, and across stores, regions,
and positions; and demonstrated that the gap could not be caused by
neutral factors.24 Second, a labor economist documented the gender
gap in management at Wal-Mart compared to its competitors, and his
statistical analysis demonstrated that the gender gap could not be due
to chance.25 And third, a sociologist analyzed Wal-Mart's personnel
practices and culture, and explained how the unfettered discretion and
strong corporate culture could allow discrimination to operate. 26
In addition to the statistical and social science evidence, the plain-
tiffs provided anecdotal evidence of several incidents in which deci-
sions were made on the basis of gender, or comments or actions by
management revealed that gender stereotypes permeated their think-
ing.27 The plaintiffs also argued that because the relief they sought
was primarily equitable-backpay has traditionally been considered a
form of equitable rather than legal relief28-injunctive relief prevailed
over the monetary relief sought, and thus the class could be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). 29
Wal-Mart's defense disputed both the 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(2) issues.
Regarding 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement, Wal-Mart focused
primarily on the admissibility and validity of expert testimony. 30 Wal-
Mart further argued that the class lacked commonality because not
every woman in the class was affected the same way (or maybe at all)
by the promotion, pay, and job assignment policies.31 The defense
emphasized the complexity of the case: the sheer size of the class
23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011).
24. See id. at 2549, 2555.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 2549, 2553.
27. Id. at 2556; id. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 230 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-17 (1975) (characterizing
backpay as equitable, but not deciding that it is). But see Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 218-19 n.4
(concluding that the language of Title VII did not necessarily characterize backpay as equitable
relief).
29. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559-61.
30. See id. at 2549.
31. See Brief for Petitioner at 8-13, 16-23, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (No. 10-277).
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(somewhere between 500,000 and 1.5 million women), the large num-
ber of stores, the different types of stores, the large number of depart-
ments, the large number of job classifications, and the number of
potential nondiscriminatory reasons that could have been considered
in making these decisions.32 Wal-Mart also argued against certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(2), stating that because backpay was sought for
the class, monetary relief predominated over injunctive relief.33
The Supreme Court essentially agreed with Wal-Mart and the dis-
senting judges from the Ninth Circuit and reversed the certification of
the class.34 All nine of the justices thought that certification of the
class was improper under Rule 23(b)(2), holding that backpay claims
of the class members qualified as monetary relief and would
predominate over the injunctive relief sought. 35 On the question of
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), the split was five-to-four along the
expected ideological lines: Justice Scalia, with Justices Alito, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts were in the majority; Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissented.
B. Commonality
On the Rule 23(a)(2) issue, the Court reversed the certification en-
tirely, holding that the putative class failed to meet the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 36 That rule requires a party seeking
class certification to prove that there are "questions of law or fact
common to the class."'37 The majority reasoned that the claims must
"depend upon a common contention" that, once decided, "will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
32. Id. at 3, 5-6, 10-13, 26-29, 39-41.
33. See id. at 46-55.
34. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-61.
35. In the unanimous portion of the opinion, the Court held that claims for monetary relief
may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), at least when the monetary relief was not incidental to
the requested injunctive or declaratory relief. See id. at 2557. And because Wal-Mart was enti-
tled to individualized determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay, those claims
were not incidental to the requested injunctive or declaratory relief in this case. See id. at 2557,
2560-61. Based on the Rule's history and structure, the Court held, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only
when a single, indivisible remedy would provide relief to each class member, and issues of pre-
dominance do not apply. See id. at 2557-59. Individualized monetary claims belong instead in
Rule 23(b)(3), which provides extra procedural protections for class members. See id. at
2558-59. The Court declined to decide whether monetary claims can ever be certified under
23(b)(2). See id. at 2557. The dissent would have remanded to allow the district court to deter-
mine whether the class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Id. at 2556-57 (majority opinion).
37. See id. at 2550-51.
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stroke."38 The majority further held that plaintiffs in a class action
need "significant proof" of commonality and, because proof of com-
monality necessarily overlaps with proof of the merits of the plaintiffs'
claim, they must also have significant proof of their claim. 39
Here, the claim alleged that Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination. In the majority's view, discrimination claims
require an inquiry into the reasons for particular employment deci-
sions; in this action, the plaintiffs were essentially suing for millions of
employment decisions. 40 A common question required there to be
some element that held together the alleged reasons for those deci-
sions, and the majority reasoned that the plaintiffs needed significant
proof that this unifying element was a general, corporate-wide policy
of discrimination. 41 A general policy driving the individual decisions
was the only way that the majority saw to either link those decisions
sufficiently as having a common cause or to hold the business entity
responsible for those decisions.
The majority then found that the plaintiffs had failed to provide
sufficient proof through their expert testimony and the anecdotal evi-
dence.42 Because Wal-Mart had a written policy that prohibited dis-
crimination, the Court found that it undermined any inference that
the company had engaged in pattern or practice of discrimination. 43
Moreover, other evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination
also failed to show commonality through a de facto policy."
Although it did not cite to Twombly or Iqbal, the majority seemed
to draw very heavily upon the notion of plausibility in analyzing
whether the evidence demonstrated commonality. 45 The majority rea-
soned that the expert testimony that Wal-Mart's corporate culture was
vulnerable to gender bias-that it was possible-did not show that the
employment decisions at issue were caused by gender bias-that it was
proven true or at least probable.46 The majority further reasoned that
in a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it is unlikely
that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way
without some common, specific direction.47
38. Id. at 2551.
39. See id. at 2551-53.
40. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-55; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
41. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
42. See id. at 2556-57.
43. Id. at 2554-55.
44. See id. at 2555-57.
45. Cf. id. at 2554-56.
46. See id. at 2553-54.
47. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
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On this point, the majority's worldview and assumptions about be-
havior proved central to its conclusions about what was plausible. The
majority reasoned that it would be difficult to prove commonality
when a company's official policy was for individual decision makers to
exercise their discretion, stating that "left to their own devices most
managers in any corporation-and surely most managers in a corpora-
tion that forbids sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, per-
formance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no
actionable disparity at all," even if some would select criteria that
cause a disparate impact and some would use sex to decide.48 Simi-
larly, the statistical proof of pay disparities on a regional or national
level could not be used to prove that those same disparities existed
equally at the store level at which the pay decisions were made.49 Ad-
ditionally, the anecdotal evidence was too sparse for the size of the
class.50
The dissent disagreed with this view of the evidence. The dissent
believed that the evidence showed a distinctive pattern of discrimina-
tory decision making. The sociologist had shown how the policy of
discretion, combined with the strong corporate culture and the high
level of gender stereotyping, made sex discrimination possible. The
statistician and the labor economist showed how this discrimination
played out in a pattern of pay and promotion disparities, including at
the store level.51 The anecdotal evidence gave life to the numbers by
providing evidence of how individual supervisors made their deci-
sions.52 In this way, each type of evidence built on the other to show
all together how discretion could produce the promotional and pay
disparities observed.
The dissent also criticized the majority for ignoring prior class ac-
tion decisions and for effectively revisiting facts the district court had
found. The dissent sharply criticized the majority for importing a "dis-
similarities" approach from 23(b)(3) into the issue of commonality
under 23(a)(2).5 3 The requirements of Rule 23(a) were meant to es-
tablish a threshold by articulating criteria necessary to, but not suffi-
cient for certification.54 On the other hand, the rules in 23(b) were
designed to provide the rules for sufficiency, along with procedural
48. Id. at 2554.
49. See id. at 2555-56.
50. Id. at 2556.
51. See id. at 2563-65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. See id. at 2563-64.
53. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565-67.
54. See id. at 2566.
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protections for different types of classes.55 It was this dissimilarities
approach that allowed the majority to focus on what divided members
of the class rather than on what united them, thereby magnifying the
former to the point that they eclipsed the latter.56
The Court's analysis in Dukes is highly puzzling as a doctrinal mat-
ter, with regard to both the law governing class actions and the law of
employment discrimination. While the Court recited rules from its
prior cases that governed the task of district courts in deciding
whether to certify a class, it never acknowledged its own standard of
review over such a decision. This omission is a serious one. The
Court noted, "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A
party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that
there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of
law or fact, etc."'57
This description sounds as if the party seeking certification must
prove a fact, which would make the court's conclusion on that issue a
finding of fact. Findings of fact are usually subject to review under the
highly deferential "clearly erroneous" standard, yet the Court appears
to have weighed the evidence and come to a conclusion different from
that of the district court, essentially finding that the plaintiffs' descrip-
tion of how the class suffered a common injury was not believable-
that is, not plausible.
III. WHAT DUKES TELLS Us ABOUT PLAUSIBILITY
Plausibility is currently a hot topic in civil procedure circles after the
Court reframed the definition of Rule 8 to embody a plausibility stan-
dard. Before Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court had
used plausibility substantively in an antitrust case when it described
what a court should do when reviewing a summary judgment mo-
tion.58 When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Twombly, it
changed the general standard for evaluating the sufficiency of com-
plaints in federal court by adding a requirement of plausibility, spark-
ing a debate that focused on- what exactly "plausible" meant in this
context.59 The consensus was that it could not mean any sort of fac-
55. See id.
56. Id. at 2565-67.
57. Id. at 2551 (majority opinion).
58. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Ed-
ward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of "Plausible Pleadings": An Introduction to the Sympo-
sium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 10 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2010).
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tual plausibility, that it must instead mean legal plausibility because
the job of the court at the pleadings stage is to make a decision based
only on the legal questions presented. 60
A complaint is supposed to be a short, plain statement of the
grounds for the court's jurisdiction; a short, plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for
relief.61 A complaint is designed to give defendants "fair notice" of
the claims against them-what injury the plaintiffs have suffered and
what entitles them to the relief they seek. 62 A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, then, asks whether plaintiffs are entitled to
offer evidence to support their claims, that is, whether the law would
provide relief for the conduct and injury described.63 The standard is
a question of the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not an assessment
of whether the facts alleged are likely to be true.64
Despite this relative clarity, in theory, that plausibility must mean
legal rather than factual plausibility, when the Court applied Twombly
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the allegation found implausible sounded like a
question concerning facts: whether Attorney General John Ashcroft
was plausibly the architect of a policy to detain Arab Muslims because
of their ethnicity and religion. 65 The Court found that this motive was
not plausible, that the result of the detention of Arab Muslims could
have been caused by the impact of a nondiscriminatory policy de-
signed to preserve the security of the nation, and that this scenario
was actually more plausible than that alleged by the plaintiff.66
In reaching this conclusion, the Court paraphrased the holding in
Twombly, stating that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plain-
tiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. '67
The Court continued, quoting Twombly, "Where a complaint pleads
facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
60. Cf Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that courts must take the
factual allegations in the complaint as true however "doubtful in fact" they are).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
62. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
63. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
64. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.1; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)
("What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a
complaint's factual allegations.").
65. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009).
66. Id. at 680-82.
67. Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007)).
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relief. ' 68 In other words, the Court seemed to hold that where infer-
ences from the facts alleged could support two different interpreta-
tions-one that would give rise to relief and one that would not-a
court should accept the interpretation that would not give rise to relief
if it found that such an interpretation was plausible.
Applying these rules to the complaint, the majority refused to ac-
cept the allegations in the complaint as true that Attorney General
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller knew of, condoned, and
agreed to subject the plaintiff to harsh conditions of confinement
solely because of his religion, race, and national origin, rather than for
a legitimate penological interest; that Ashcroft was the principal archi-
tect of the policy; or that Mueller was instrumental in adopting and
enforcing it.69 According to the Court, these allegations were too con-
clusory.70 The Court stated that the remaining allegations, "[t]aken as
true . . . are consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating de-
tainees 'of high interest' because of their race, religion, or national
origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly estab-
lish this purpose. ' 71 In other words, the Court did not believe the
assertion of the defendant's motive in the complaint, and, because im-
proper motive was an element of the underlying claim, the Court held
that it did not have to accept that allegation as true.72
The Court distinguished between facts that are well-pleaded and
those that are conclusory and thus not really facts, but something
more like a conclusion about the law-a "formulaic recitation of the
elements" of the underlying claim.73 But this distinction seems unsat-
isfactory when the Court ultimately appeared to say that it did not
believe that the defendants would act the way that the plaintiffs al-
leged they had acted.
To be sure, part of the problem is caused by the muddled distinction
between facts and law.74 For purposes of allocating decisions between
juries and judges, and between trial courts and appellate courts, the
legal system makes distinctions between what are questions of law and
what are questions of fact. 75 The distinction, though appealing and
68. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
69. Id. at 680-81.
70. Id. at 681.
71. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 680-82.
73. Id. at 680-81.
74. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Para-
dox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 914-16, 924-29 (2010).
75. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1769, 1769 (2003) ("Significant consequences attach to whether an issue is labeled 'legal'
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firmly entrenched, is quite fuzzy in the details, to the point that we
recognize many areas of "mixed" questions in which rules or stan-
dards are applied to underlying events.76 And when elements of a
claim are described, they are termed "ultimate facts," or facts essen-
tial to the claim or a defense, 77 which means they are conclusions that
the trier of fact must reach through consideration of both the facts
most directly shown by the evidence and the inferences that may be
drawn from those facts.
Thus, it seems that plausibility has a factual implication. The courts
are allowed to ask whether the plaintiff's allegations are believable,
which implicitly invites the judges to ask whether they believe the alle-
gations.78 The decision in Dukes seems to take this notion one step
further. Not only can courts consider the plausibility of inferences
when evaluating a complaint for sufficiency, they can also use plausi-
bility to reweigh the facts that support class certification. Therefore,
one possible consequence of the Dukes decision is evisceration of the
formerly deferential standard of review for certification decisions by
district courts.
It is possible, though, that the Dukes Court would disagree that it
reweighed facts found by the district court. Perhaps the majority be-
lieved that they were instead interpreting the law of employment dis-
crimination and explaining as a matter of law what it means for an
employer to engage in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Edward
Brunet has contended, based on the substantive use of plausibility in
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., that sub-
stantive law can "limit[ ] the range of permissible inferences from am-
biguous evidence. '79 This may "empower judges with a substantive
ability to fashion new norms by reconsidering factual inferences; with
good reasons a judge can change a denial or grant of summary judg-
or 'factual'-whether a judge or jury will decide the issue; if, and under what standard, there will
be appellate review; whether the issue is subject to evidence and discovery rules; whether proce-
dural devices such as burdens of proof apply; and whether the decision has precedential value.").
76. Id. at 1778-79.
77. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 671 (9th ed. 2009).
78. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense."); see also Tung Yin, "I Do Not Think [Implausible] Means What
You Think It Means": tqbal v. Ashcroft and Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 203, 212 (2010). See generally Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Disposi-
tive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759 (2009). Importantly, for the motion to dismiss stage, the
question about believability is asked before plaintiffs conduct discovery. A plaintiff may need
facts that are "in the hands (or minds) of defendants and third parties" in order to successfully
satisfy the plausibility standard, but how is the plaintiff to discover those facts? Scott Dodson,
Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEwIs & CLARK L. REV. 43, 44 (2010).
79. See Brunet, supra note 58, at 10.
2013]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ment based upon the existence of factual inferences into a new legal
rule. '80 In other words, the permissibility of certain facts is a question
of law, not of fact.
If that is what the Court did in Dukes, then perhaps the decision
says less about future class actions and more about employment dis-
crimination cases and other cases that involve difficult questions of
motive or causation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. For Employment Discrimination
Clearly, Dukes came down to the size and complexity of both Wal-
Mart's operation and the potential class. First, a majority of the Court
simply did not believe that all of the class members could possibly be
injured in the same way given the multitude of decision makers at
issue-even for the disparate impact claim, which did not require in-
tent. Second, a majority of the Court did not seem to believe that
causation, here that the plaintiffs' sex caused them to receive lower
pay and fewer promotions, can ever be proven by statistical analysis,
as a matter of law. Statistical proof of causation is used not just in
employment discrimination cases, but in other areas of law as well.
Causation is demonstrated by sophisticated statistical analysis in med-
ical malpractice cases,81 toxic torts,82 and antitrust cases, 83 to name a
few additional situations. More importantly, at least in employment
discrimination cases, the Dukes majority did not seem to think that
this type of bias can form the basis for a disparate treatment case.
Central to its reasoning is the statement by the majority that "left to
their own devices most managers in any corporation-and surely most
managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-would se-
lect sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion
that produce no actionable disparity at all."'8 4 This statement reflects
a number of important assumptions. First, it shows that the majority
has a particular view of how people make decisions and what influ-
ences those decisions. Second, it shows that the majority has a defini-
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201,
1222-23 (2012) (discussing proof of malpractice by differential etiology-a study of probability).
82. See generally Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Per-
suasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986) (describing how statistics are used in
toxic torts cases).
83. See generally Hanns A. Abele et al., Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 847 (2011) (discussing sophisticated statistical techniques used to
prove causation in tort law related to antitrust cases).
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 2554 (2011).
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tion of discrimination that limits liability to human actors and bases
that liability on the Justices' views of the decision-making process.
And finally, though couched in language of neutrality, it shows that
the Justices in the Dukes majority fundamentally believe that their
judgments about the world are more reliable than those of other
judges or social scientists.
1. The Justices on Human Decision Making
The Justices seem to believe that people make decisions in a fairly
rigorous, logical, and self-aware way-that people are rational actors.
Rational actors recognize that they must pick some course of action
from a set of potential actions, define the minimum criteria necessary
for consideration of a course of action, define further criteria that
would make a course of action more or less desirable based on a fixed
ideal, and weigh the costs and benefits of alternatives. 85 Even when
people make snap judgments, common wisdom holds that decisions
are caused by reasons and that the decision maker knows what those
reasons are. 86 To the extent that the rational actor model is envi-
sioned by the Dukes majority as a description of behavior rather than
an ideal for behavior-a fact rather than an aspiration-it is capable
of empirical testing and, actually, has been the subject of significant
empirical research in the last several decades. 87
Yet, while the Dukes majority might agree that facts are capable of
empirical testing, it seems not to countenance the notion that the
human decision making process is that kind of fact because it rejected
the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby. Perhaps the Justices
think that decisions are caused by thoughts and, because thoughts oc-
cur in the brain of an individual and cannot be seen, individual reason
85. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20 (2011); JAMES G.
MARCH WITH CHIP HEATH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: How DECISIONS HAPPEN 1-5
(1994).
86. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 85, at 4 ("You believe you know what goes on in your mind,
which often consists of one conscious thought leading in an orderly way to another."); id. at 8
("Social scientists in the 1970s broadly accepted two ideas about human nature. First, people are
generally rational, and their thinking is normally sound. Second, emotions such as fear, affec-
tion, and hatred explain most of the occasions on which people depart from rationality."); id. at 9
(explaining how including the questions from studies in articles allowed readers to see flaws in
their own thinking that they had not realized they fell prey to).
87. The field of cognitive psychology was created to study how people think. It was founded
as a discipline by Ulric Neisser in the late 1960s. See Douglas Martin, Ulric Neisser is Dead at 83;
Reshaped Study of the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at A20. For more information on the
studies of human cognition, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 85 (describing and citing hundreds of
studies); DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2003) (explaining that the
sense people have of free will is sometimes illusory); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124 (1974).
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is an appropriate tool to assess that process. Perhaps the Justices in
the Dukes majority did not believe that the social sciences that study
and test human decision making can really measure or assess that de-
cision making because the process cannot be seen or touched. In
other words, they may believe that their own introspection and rea-
soning is a better tool than any social science method.
While not all scientists agree on every detail, there is a remarkable
amount of consensus among cognitive psychologists, those who study
the mental processes of "memory, perception, learning, thinking, rea-
soning, language, and understanding," 88 that the rational actor model
is not in fact an accurate description of how people think or make
decisions. Instead, our intuitions, impressions, and decisions often
take place without us knowing how they entered into our conscious
experience. 89 When we are confronted with a problem, the answer
that comes to mind might not be the answer to the original question,
like "will this person be a good worker?"; rather, it may be an answer
to an easier and related question, such as "Have I seen many others
like this person be good workers?" 90 Cognitive psychologists have
shown the way that both cognitive structures and shortcuts in reason-
ing influence judgment and shape intuition, "biasing in predictable
ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of
information about other people." 91
This research suggests that conventional wisdom about what it
means to discriminate "because of" an individual's identity character-
istic may be too narrow if it limits liability to incidents of fully self-
aware prejudice. 92 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has de-
fined discrimination, although the Court has colloquially referred to
88. Roy LACHMAN ET AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 6
(1979) (defining the field of cognitive psychology). According to the authors, the field is domi-
nated by information processing study,
defined . . .as the way man collects, stores, modifies, and interprets environmental
information or information already stored internally. [Those who study information
processing] are interested in knowing how he adds information to his permanent
knowledge of the world, how he accesses it again, and how he uses his knowledge in
every facet of human activity.
Id. at 7.
89. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 85, at 4.
90. See id. at 15.
91. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. EMP. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995). See generally
KAHNEMAN, supra note 85, at 109-95, 267-74 (describing the kinds of biases to which we tend to
be subject).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.").
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one kind of discrimination as "intentional disparate treatment. '93
Moreover, the Court has never definitively required that an actor be
fully self-aware of the reasons for his or her decision.94 Thus, there is
room for evolution in the meaning of discrimination as the state of
science regarding how people make decisions continues to advance.
Admittedly, there are some serious disputes about the state of that
science, but they are predominantly between lawyers rather than ex-
perts within the scientific community. For example, Laurens Walker
and John Monahan wrote an article in 1987 that described the use of
social science evidence as giving fact-finders "information about the
social and psychological context in which contested adjudicative facts
occurred" in order to "help the [fact-finder] interpret" them.95 Other
scholars have urged the courts to consider social science in assessing
what constitutes discrimination. 96 When Dr. Bielby and Dr. Susan
Fiske sought to testify on behalf of plaintiffs in gender discrimination
suits about how the decision-making structures of the defendant com-
panies allowed decision makers to rely on sex stereotyping in making
decisions,97 Professors Walker and Monahan argued that such expert
evidence should not be allowed to link what is true about society gen-
erally to specific practices within an employer.98 Professors Melissa
Hart and Paul Secunda challenged this change of heart by Walker and
Monahan, arguing that such evidence was properly admitted and, fur-
ther, that the resistance to it was an argument about what it means to
discriminate. 99
The Court rejected Dr. Bielby's testimony, just as Professors
Monahan and Walker urged it to do.100 In doing so, the Court did not
93. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983); Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90 (1982); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
94. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analy-
sis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 766 (1987).
95. See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133, 133 (citing Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987)).
96. See, e.g., Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Krieger, supra
note 91, at 1161; Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 80 (2003).
97. See William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?: Challenges of Using Expert Testimony on
Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 377,
387-90, 395 (2003) (describing the testimony).
98. See John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance
of "Social Frameworks", 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2008).
99. Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 39-41 (2009).
100. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).
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explain its position as a refinement of employment discrimination law.
Yet, because it seemed to rely on a notion of plausibility and because
it framed the discussion about the evidence on implicit bias as insuffi-
ciently linked to the individual decision makers at Wal-Mart, the
Court's holding will likely be interpreted to limit what constitutes em-
ployment discrimination.
2. The Justices on the Law of Discrimination
I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court no longer appears
to believe in a core principle found in the early discrimination cases-
that discrimination exists frequently enough that, absent some other
explanation, it is reasonable to infer that discrimination caused an em-
ployer to take an adverse employment action against an employee. 101
Implicit bias evidence provides contextual support for the background
belief necessary to those early cases. It is one step in a chain of infer-
ences that the trier of fact must take to reach a conclusion of discrimi-
nation. It sets the stage to illustrate how people in the aggregate tend
to behave when making decisions and how stereotypes play a role in
those decisions. The Court implicitly rejected even that limited role,
however, by rejecting Dr. Bielby's testimony.10 2
Thus, it seems that the Court has adopted a view about what it
means to discriminate that makes background facts about discrimina-
tion irrelevant to questions about employer liability. Consider the
work of Professor Richard Nagareda, work that the Court relied on
heavily, which described what the courts must do in applying Rule
23(b)(2) in factual terms:
Class certification is not a matter of mere pleading but, rather, of
affirmative proof that the requirements stated in Rule 23 have been
satisfied. The court must make a "definitive assessment" that these
requirements have been met, even if that assessment entails the res-
olution of conflicting proof and happens to overlap with an issue-
even a critical one-on the merits.103
Professor Nagareda characterized the standard the district court must
use as "the usual preponderance standard, not the standard for a mo-
tion to dismiss, for admissibility under Daubert, or for trial-worthiness
101. See Marcia L. McCormick, Disparate Impact and Equal Protection After Ricci v. DeStef-
ano, 27 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'y 100 (2012); see also Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimina-
tion: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275,
1278-79 (2012); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimi-
nation, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 118, 143 (2010).
102. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000).
103. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 100 (2009) (citations omitted).
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as a matter for summary judgment. ' 10 4 At another point in the same
article, however, he described the certification question as a "mixed
question of fact and law."' 10 5 Eventually, Professor Nagareda con-
cluded that in Dukes, the issue of whether the class had common ques-
tions that predominated over individual ones was really a question of
law.t0 6 By adopting Professor Nagareda's analysis, then, the Court
may have agreed that it was deciding a question of law.
The Court did not explain, however, that it was deciding what dis-
crimination meant as a legal matter. Yet when the Court adopted
Professor Nagareda's analysis, it also adopted his reasoning on the law
of discrimination. Professor Nagareda was not an employment dis-
crimination scholar, however, and his reasoning did not accurately
capture the law of Title VII. He seemed to assert that any time a
pattern of discrimination fell short of almost total segregation on the
basis of a protected class, no inference of disparate treatment could be
drawn. 10 7 He classified the plaintiffs' theory as one of "structural" dis-
crimination because it relied in part on evidence about implicit bias
and sex stereotyping. 10 8 He then concluded that the underlying dis-
pute was about the definition of discrimination and thus subject to de
novo review.109 This conflation of sex stereotyping and structural dis-
crimination is simply incorrect. The law on sex stereotyping is more
nuanced and more thoroughly recognized as a form of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII than Professor Nagareda acknowledged. 10
Moreover, his reasoning failed to consider disparate impact, the other
theory of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs. Thus, the Court, at
least implicitly, changed the law by rejecting a definition of discrimi-
nation that considered evidence of implicit bias.
Notably, the implicit bias evidence was not the only evidence that
decision makers at Wal-Mart were engaging in a pattern and practice
of discrimination. Plaintiffs also provided sophisticated evidence of a
104. Id. at 129 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. at 159.
107. See id. at 155.
108. Id. at 158-59.
109. Nagareda, supra note 103, at 159.
110. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (explaining how ste-
reotypes about women and caregiving worked to keep women out of the workplace); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing that sex stereotyping is disparate treat-
ment sex discrimination); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (concluding
that wholly subjective promotion standards could allow decision makers to use racial stereo-
types); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-90, 285 n.17 (1987) (explaining
that stereotypes about pregnant workers would be disparate treatment and inconsistent with the
goals of Title VII).
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gender pay gap within and across stores, regions, and positions, in-
cluding proof that the gap was not caused by neutral factors. Further,
the plaintiffs provided evidence that the gender promotion gap was
significant compared to Wal-Mart's competitors, and that the gap
could not be due to chance. Three key pieces of expert evidence ex-
isted: (1) discrimination can thrive where complete discretion is left to
decision makers steeped in a common culture that contained stereo-
typed views of women; (2) women were systematically underpaid and
this underpayment was caused by their sex; and (3) women were sys-
tematically under-promoted and that under-promotion was not caused
by chance.111 Taking expert evidence combined with the anecdotal
evidence, a rational fact-finder could conclude that the pay and pro-
motion gaps were the result of sex-based discrimination, and that the
pattern affected all women to some extent.
Going forward, the decision in Dukes will stand for the principle
that only decisions made with the fully self-aware goal of penalizing a
person because of her sex, race, or other protected status is discrimi-
nation under Title VII. Additionally, the decision will likely be used
to argue that statistical regression analysis, a technique designed to
test causation, cannot be used to prove whether a state of mind caused
an effect.
B. For Other Kinds of Cases
As the prior Part suggests, the greatest impact of Dukes, both sub-
stantively and procedurally, will undoubtedly be on class action em-
ployment discrimination cases, whether they are disparate treatment
or disparate impact cases. Additionally, there will be both procedural
and substantive ramifications for other kinds of cases.
In procedural terms, the dissimilarities approach, which is now a
part of the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality inquiry, will prove an espe-
cially high hurdle in cases that present facts that conflict with judges'
worldview. It was evident in this case, as it has been in many other
employment discrimination cases at every level of court, that the ma-
jority of judges do not believe that employment discrimination occurs
very often. And it was this worldview that prompted the majority to
find the claims of commonality essentially implausible. For other legal
wrongs that courts find unlikely to occur, like the antitrust claim in
Twombly and the civil rights claim in Iqbal, the chances of framing a
successful class action seem very slim.
111. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011).
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Similarly, in cases that involve complex questions of causation, such
as toxic torts or environmental injuries, or actions by or motives of
multiple people, or in cases in which effects or injuries vary signifi-
cantly among members of the putative class, plaintiffs will likely have
a difficult time proceeding as a class. Each of these types of classes
involves enough complexity and potential dissimilarity that they are
analogous to the type of class proposed in Dukes.
That is not where the similarity ends, though. The Dukes decision
suggests that a majority of justices on the Court do not believe that
statistical analysis, even regression or other similarly sophisticated
types of analyses that show very tight correlations and control for mul-
tiple variables, are useful in building a case. The majority employed
the same form of slicing and dicing of the evidence-looking at each
piece in isolation and requiring that piece alone to conclusively prove
the plaintiff class's commonality-that courts often use in employ-
ment cases.1 12 In fact, the Court seemed to dismiss the statistical evi-
dence as less valid than any other kind of evidence. 113 As a
substantive matter, suspicion of statistical evidence will prove prob-
lematic for the wide range of cases that might typically rely on it-
complex financial or tax cases, antitrust cases, voting rights cases, pat-
ent infringement cases, real estate cases, and a variety of tort cases, for
example. Finally, as a substantive matter, the suspicion of social sci-
ence evidence will have ramifications in essentially any type of case in
which liability depends upon a person's state of mind.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Dukes decision made structural litigation, class ac-
tions of all types, and individual civil rights claims more difficult,
lower courts have begun fleshing out rules that do not completely
foreclose these types of cases. Litigators should take note of these
trends. Generally, classes more limited in the number of members, in
actors who caused the injuries, and in geographic area of injury (not
112. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA.
L. REV. 577, 585, 592 (2001); see also Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of Practicing
Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 183-84 (2005).
113. The Court has had an uneasy relationship with statistics. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that a statistical study, which showed black defendants who killed
white victims were four times more likely to get the death penalty than white defendants who
killed black victims, was not enough to show discrimination); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L.
Willborn, The Story of Hazelwood: Employment Discrimination by the Numbers, in EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 48, 63 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (describing the Court's
ambivalence about statistical analysis in a pattern and practice employment discrimination case).
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nationwide) are more likely to be successful. 114 This was the lesson
that the attorneys who represented the plaintiff class learned from
Dukes. They filed two regional class actions to replace the initial, na-
tionwide claim: one in the Texas region, and the other in the Califor-
nia region. 11 5
There are additional important lessons. How the injury and its
cause are framed matters greatly. The easiest case for certifying a
class would be a situation in which a single wrong harms a significant
number of people. 1 6 Thus, when the injury can be framed as caused
by a single source, like municipal liability cases in which a pattern of
actions might be framed in terms of an institutional entity's policy or
custom, commonality will be easier to demonstrate.11 7 In such a case,
the injury would be framed as the risk of a more specific injury, a risk
shared equally by all members of a class subject to the actions of that
institutional entity.118
A court may not accept that frame, however, and, especially if many
members of the class were injured in different ways, may still focus on
the different injuries caused by the system that is alleged to have been
a policy or a practice.119 In other words, when the injury is viewed as
114. See, e.g., Connor B. v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Mass. 2011) (refusing to decertify a
class of all children in the custody of the Massachusetts State Department of Children and Fami-
lies because the class was not too expansive and each class member was subject to the risk of
harm identified in the complaint).
115. See Attention Present and Former Female Employees of Wal-Mart or Sam's Club in the
United States, WAL-MART CLASS WEBSITE, http://www.walmartclass.com/public home.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013); see also Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Odle v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-02954), available at http://www.
walmartclass.com/staticdata/10 %20P's%2OAmend.%2OComplaint%201-19-12.pdf; Plaintiffs'
Fourth Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (No. C-
01-2253-CRB), available at http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/Fourth%20Amended%20
complaint %20final%20with %20exhibits.pdf.
116. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 318 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (refusing to
decertify a class of purchasers that bought from a single wholesaler who allegedly controlled
enough of the diamond market to violate antitrust laws because antitrust activities similarly in-
jured members of the class by driving up prices); Gray v. Hearst Commc'ns., Inc., 444 Fed. App'x
698, 700-02 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming certification when members of a class of advertisers were
similarly injured by misrepresentations in uniform contracts that were used by defendant with
each member of the class); Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170,
1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing a shareholder class action focused on the fraud on the market
theory to prceed).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100634, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2012).
119. M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 841-43 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that even though children in
custody of Texas Permanent Managing Conservatorship were all subject to the alleged constitu-
tional deficiencies within the Conservatorship, they were all injured in different ways such that at
least some claims required assessing whether the conduct at issue shocked the conscience); Jamie
S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 496-98 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting certification of a class
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having been caused by multiple discrete decisions by multiple decision
makers, or any other similar series of events, it will be difficult to cer-
tify a class. 120 Conversely, if the plaintiff class can prove how specific
practices work together to cause a single injury, the class has a better
chance of being sustained.121 Hence, there is significant room for
framing and advocacy by lawyers.
The challenge in employment discrimination cases may be signifi-
cantly greater. The majority of the Court seems to have rejected not
only the underlying premises of the employment discrimination cause
of action, but also many of the tools that, together, might persuade a
fact-finder that what has happened in an employment situation is dis-
crimination. The idea of discrimination as disparate treatment has
narrowed, the idea of discrimination as disparate impact seems to
have disappeared entirely, and the method of looking at the evidence
seems to have been further restricted. Numerous prior cases have
been called into question, seemingly overruled without the Court's ac-
knowledgement that it was doing so, or "stealth overruled.' 1 22 Two
examples are Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. ,123 which held that courts
should interpret allegations of discrimination liberally, and Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products,24 which held that evidence in a dis-
crimination case should be viewed holistically rather than each piece
in isolation.
Perhaps this challenge means that it is time to change tactics and
move away from litigation. 125 Advocates for change may need to de-
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act when the inquiry at issue was child
specific).
120. See, e.g., Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 894-96 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that
discrimination that allegedly took place across multiple sites of an employer could not be certi-
fied because the injury depended on all supervisors being motivated the same way, which would
be nearly impossible to prove); Bennet v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 813-16 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that because different parts of a single plant had different supervision and policies, a
class of about 100 black employees lacked commonality); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657
F.3d 970, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding certification in response to Dukes,
suggesting that if decisions are made in a decentralized way, a class will not be certifiable).
121. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491-92
(7th Cir. 2012) (reversing the denial of class certification when plaintiffs specifically demon-
strated how a practice operated to cause a disparate impact on members of a class, which indi-
cated that the claim was most efficiently addressed on a classwide basis).
122. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Mi-
randa v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (noting that the Court has interpreting cases so as to
eviscerate their effects).
123. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
124. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
125. This is a common exhortation in my scholarship. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick,
Decoupling Employment, 16 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 499 (2012) (advocating for policymakers
to stop using the employment relationship to distribute social goods so that there would be less
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velop new strategies to persuade the public to support change through
social media, through a change in the law, or through change on the
ground by demanding, as consumers and employees, that businesses
conform their practices to change the way they operate in order to
prevent discriminatory practices that systematically disadvantage his-
torically disadvantaged groups. If the "Wal-Mart Effect" has trans-
formed the American economy, 126 just imagine the impact that the
Wal-Mart Customer Effect could have.
at stake in that relationship likely to trigger unconscious or conscious biases); Marcia L. McCor-
mick, Consensus, Dissensus, and Enforcement: Legal Protection of Working Women from the
Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire to Today, N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 647
(2011) (arguing that the lack of consensus on discrimination dooms enforcement and change);
Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. Louis U. L.J.
39, 43 (2011) (exploring constitutional limitations on an agency designed to adjudicate discrimi-
nation claims); Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidis-
crimination Enforcement for the Twenty-first Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193
(2009) (advocating a truth commission model to explore the state of the nation's workplaces);
Marcia L. McCormick, The Equality Paradise: Paradoxes of the Law's Power to Advance Equal-
ity, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 515, 516-17 (2007) (arguing that the structures of law in the
United States are not good at producing change).
126. See CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECr 4-5, 246-47 (2006).
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